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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
FRED N. HOBSON, et ux,
Plaintiffs and Respondents,
- vsPANGUITCH LAKE
CORPORATION, et al,
Defendants, Third-Party
Plaintiff and Appellant,
- vs DERRAL CHRISTENSEN, et ux
and etal,
Third-Party Defendants, Fourth-Party
Plaintiffs and Respondents,
- vsDELLA D. MARSDEN, et al.,
Fourth-Party Defendants
and Respondents.

Case No.
13615

APPELLANTS BRIEF
STATEMENT OF CASE
The Plaintiffs/Respondents sue to quiet title in a
parcel of real property in the possession of Defendant/
Appellant who counterclaims against Plaintiffs seeking
to quiet title to the disputed property in it.
Defendant/Appellant also filed a Third Party Complaint against Third Party Defendants for damages for
breach of covenants in a Warranty Deed conveying the
1
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property to it and for attorney's fees and costs incurred
in defending title to the property. Third Party Defendants
filed a Fourth Party Complaint against Fourth Party Defendant/Respondent for breach of covenants contained in
a Warranty Deed to them and seeking the same relief as
that claimed against them.
Hereafter the parties will be referred to as they appear in the District Court.

DISPOSITION OF CASE IN THE LOWER COURT
The District Court found in favor of the Plaintiffs
and held that there had been an oral agreement between
Plaintiffs and William Marsden, the husband of the
Fourth Party Defendant, establishing the boundary line to
the disputed property.
The Court also ruled that the Defendants could recover from the Third Party Defendants for the loss of the
disputed property with the amount to be determined by
the agreed price per acre at the time of the conveyance
rather than at the time of the breach. The Court entered
a similar award in favor of the Third Party Defendants
and against the Fourth Party Defendant.
The Court denied the claims for costs and attorney's
fees sought by the Defendant against the Third Party Defendants.

2
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NATURE OF RELIEF SOUGHT O N APPEAL
Defendant seeks to have the judgment of the Trial
Court reversed and title to the disputed property quieted
ink.
Defendant also seeks to have the Judgment of the
Trial Court reversed which denied its claim for costs and
attorney's fees against the Third Party Defendants.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
This action involves a dispute between Plaintiffs
and Defendant concerning the ownership of a parcel of
land located in Garfield County, State of Utah. The following diagram shows the property in question and the
disputed area is designated by the diagonal lines.
Section 31, T 3 5 South, R 7 West
N

3

j

Panguitchf

Lake

t

1

2

Hobson

s
3
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Prior to 1957 all of tracts 1, 2 and 3 were owned by
the Fourth Party Defendant Delia D. Marsden and her
husband William Marsden who had acquired the property from Mr. Marsden's father. (R. 297) However, on
November 1, 1957 William Marsden deeded tract 3 which
includes the disputed area to his wife, the Fourth Party
Defendant, Delia D. Marsden, along with other property. A certified copy of the Deed is at R. 122, and referred to in Finding of Fact No. 3 at R. 92.
On the 2nd day of September, 1958, the Fourth Party
Defendant Delia D. Marsden entered into a contract with
Plaintiffs to sell them the property referred to as tract 1.
(Exhibit 15, R. 251) On the same date a Warranty Deed
was executed and delivered from Fourth Party Defendant to Plaintiffs conveying to them the property referred
to as tract 1 which was described in the Deed as the Northeast quarter of the Southwest quarter of Section 31, T35 S,
R 7 W , Salt Lake Base and Meridian. (Exhibit 16, R.
254, 255)
During the month of August, 1958 the Plaintiff Fred
N . Hobson and William Marsden met in the area between
tracts 1 and 2 along with a Mr. Ralph Reynolds, an employee of Plaintiffs. (R. 140, 141) William Marsden,
through the use of a hand held compass purported to show
Plaintiff and his employee where the West boundary line
of tract 1 was located. Stakes were driven along the purported boundary line by Mr. Reynolds at the direction of
Mr. Marsden. Mr. Marsden also purported to show him
a pile of rocks which he indicated was the Northwest
corner of tract 1. (R. 149) Mr. Hobson concedes that

4
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there was no dispute between he and William Marsden as
to where the boundary line was at the time the stakes were
driven. (R. 199)
It is significant to note that the record does not contain,,, any evidence that William D. Marsden was acting
as the agent of his wife, the Fourth Party Defendant Delia
D. Marsden,, at the time he met with Plaintiff Fred N .
Hobson and purported, to advise him of the location of
the boundary line nor was any finding of fact to this effect
made by the Court.
Following the meeting on t i l l . *
' *
• '- i »\ C C l i
Plaintiff Fred N . Hobson and William I\i..:bUi:n, a lence
was constructed along the line in 1958. (R. 248) This
fence line extended beyond the legal description of tract
1 and encroached onto tract 3 as shown in die diagram.
In the year 1964 Delia I>. /uarMien ^oi^wved die
property referred to in the diagram as traci > to the Third
Party Defendants. (R. 350) Thereafter, on September 15,
1965 the Third Pari) Defendant', convened the same
property to the Defendant Panguitch Lake Corporation.
(R. 351, Exhibit 20)
In the spring of 1968 the Defendant Panguitch Lake
Corporation, after having the property line surveyed, determined that the fence erected, by the Plaintiffs encroached upon their property and had the same removed. (R.
353,, 354)
During the summer of 1968 a meeting occurred at the
disputed property line and those present included the
Plaintiff Fred N, Hobson, two representatives of Pan'•)
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guitch Lake Corporation, Oliver D. LeFevre and David
Watson. (R. 356) Also present at the meeting was Bruce
Whited, a licensed surveyor who had been retained by
the Plaintiffs to survey the property for them in June of
1968. (R. 331) Mr. Whited had determined that the boundary line in the Deed from Delia D. Marsden to the Plaintiffs was considerably to the East of the fence line which
they had erected in 1958. (R. 332) He was also aware that
Defendant Panguitch Lake Corporation had had a survey
made to establish the correct boundary line. (R. 332)
There was a slight variance between the two surveys
which would have resulted in a discrepancy at the Southwest corner of approximately ten (10) feet and Mr. Whited
advised Plaintiff Fred N . Hobson and Oliver D. LeFevre
of Panguitch Lake Corporation of this variance. (R. 333)
Upon the suggestion of Mr. Whited, the Plaintiff
Fred N . Hobson and Oliver D. LeFevre of Defendant
Panguitch Lake Corporation agreed that the correct line
should be established between the two surveys and the
line was staked. (R. 334, 335; R. 261; R. 319, 320; R.
343, 344; R. 359, 360; R. 372) A fence was constructed
along the new line by Defendant Panguitch Lake Corporation who has had possession of the property since that
date. (R. 188)
At the conclusion of the trial the parties stipulated
that the matter be submitted to the Court on written
briefs and the Plaintiffs' brief was due on January 15,
1972 with the Defendants to file their briefs within 25
days thereafter. N o brief was filed by the Plaintiffs and
the Defendants have never been firmly apprised of the

6
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| e g a l theory or theories upon which Plaintiffs ck-aw atle
to the property in question. Thereafter, on December 19,
1972 a Decision was rendered with Findings of I act,
Conclusions of Law" and a Judgment and Decree signed
by the Court on December 29, 1972. (R. 91, 9S)

ARGUMENT
POIN1 T
THE TITLE T O IRACTS i AND 3 WAS
VESTED IN DELLA D. MARSDEN AT THE
TIME PLAINTIFFS PURCHASED THEIR INTEREST IN TRACT I
As was noted in the Statement of Facts, on November
1, 1957, William Marsden executed a Warranty Deed
conveying title to tracts 1 and 3 to his wife Delia D. Marsden which Deed was recorded on July 26, 1958. Finding
of Fact No. 3 provides in part as follows:
"That William Marsden executed a Warranty
Deed which was recorded on July 30, 1958 in Book
111 at Page 569 of the Garfield County Records
conveying to Delia D. Marsden, the wife of the
grantor, the above described property. That prior
to the date of said conveyance William
Marsden
had entered into an agreement for conveyance to
Plaintiffs, Fred N . Hobson and Mary L. Hobson,
as joint tenants with full rights of survivorship
and not as tenants in common, the Northeast
Quarter of the Southwest Quarter of said Section
31.
" [Emphasis added}
The emphasized portion of the foregoing Finding is contrary to the testimony of Plaintiff Fred N. Hobson concerning this transaction. Mr. Hobson stated as follows:
/
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"Q — When did you buy it?
A — I believe it was in 1958, in approximately
August, the first 40, and then maybe a
couple of weeks later the second 40. . . ."
(R. 236, 237)
This date is further corroborated by the Sales Agreement
dated September 2, 1958 (Exhibit 15) whereby Delia D.
Marsden, who owned the property at that time, agreed to
sell tract 1 to the Plaintiffs.
The record is completely void of any evidence which
would establish an agreement between Plaintiffs and
William D. Marsden to purchase tract 1 prior to the date
of the Sales Agreement, September 2, 1958. Further, any
such purported agreement or finding of the same would
be contrary to the provisions of the Statute of Frauds,
Section 25-5-1, Utah Code Annotated, which provides as
follows:
"Estate or interest in real property. — N o estate
or interest in real property, other than leases for a
term not exceeding one year, nor any trust or
power over or concerning real property or in any
manner relating thereto, shall be created, granted,
assigned, surrendered or declared otherwise than
by act or operation of law, or by deed or conveyance in writing subscribed by the party creating,
granting, assigning, surrendering or declaring the
same, or by his lawful agent thereunto authori2ed
by writing."
As can be seen by the foregoing, it is clear that at the
time the Plaintiffs purchased their interest in tract 1, both
it and tract 3 were owned by the Fourth Party Defendant,
Delia D. Marsden. As a consequence of this, any oral
8
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agreement between Plaintiffs and William D. Marsden
purporting to establish a boundary line between tracts 1
and 3 would be ineffective as no evidence was introduced
or finding made to the effect that William D. Marsden
was the agent of the property owner Delia D. Marsden
with the authority to enter into such a transaction.
POINT II
TITLE TO THE DISPUTED PROPERTY
SHOULD BE QUIETED IN DEFENDANT
PANGUITCH LAKE CORPORATION.
A—THE PLAINTIFFS' CLAIM TO TITLE TO
THE PROPERTY CANNOT BE ESTABLISHED BY ADVERSE POSSESSION.
In order for a person to establish title to real property
by adverse possession one must maintain open, notorious,
continuous, exclusive and adverse possession of the property for a period of seven (7) years. See Cooper v. Carter
Oil Co., 7 Utah 2d 9, 316 P.2d 320.
In addition to the foregoing requirements, the claimant must have paid the taxes which have been levied on
the property pursuant to the provisions of Section 78-1212, Utah Code Annotated which provides as follows:
"Possession must be continuous, and taxes paid.—
In no case shall adverse possession be considered
established under the provisions of any section of
this Code, unless it shall be shown that the land
has been occupied and claimed for the period of
seven years continuously, and that the party, his
predecessors and grantors have paid all taxes which
have been levied and assessed upon such land according to law."
9
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

The Plaintiffs offered no evidence that they had paid
real property taxes on the disputed property and no finding of fact that such taxes had been paid by them was made
by the Court. T o the contrary, there was evidence that
the Defendant Panguitch Lake Corporation had paid the
taxes on the disputed property. (R. 361)
B—THE PLAINTIFFS' CLAIM OF TITLE T O
THE PROPERTY CANNOT BE ESTABLISHED BY THE DOCTRINE OF BOUNDARY BY
ACQUIESCENCE.
For the purpose of this argument only, the Defendant Panguitch Lake Corporation will concede that William D. Marsden was the agent of and had the authority
from the Fourth Party Defendant Delia D. Marsden to
agree with the Plaintiffs as to the location of the boundary line.
The Supreme Court of the State of Utah has set forth
the requirements necessary in order for a person to establish title to a disputed area of property based upon the doctrine by acquiescence. In the case of Fuoco v. Williams,
18 Utah 2d 282, 421 P.2d 944, the Court stated as follows:
"In former opinions this Court has required four
prerequisites to establish a presumption of boundary by acquiescence. They are: (1) occupation u p to
a visible line marked by monuments, fences or
buildings, (2) mutual acquiescence in the line as
the boundary, (3) for a long period of years, (4)
by adjoining land owners."
As was noted in the Statement of Facts, in 1958 the
construction of a fence was commenced by the Plaintiffs
10
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along the boundary line claimed by them pursuant to
the agreement with William D. Marsden which was entered into in August of 1958. This fence line remained in
existence until it was removed by Defendant Panguitch
Lake Corporation in 1968. (R. 354) In 1968 the Defendant Panguitch Lake Corporation constructed a fence along
the correct line as established by the surveyors and agreed
to by the adjoining land owners. (R. 360)
Thus, the critical question for determination is whether the Plaintiffs' possession of the disputed property for
a period of ten (10) years is sufficient to comply with the
requirement that the boundary line be observed for a
"long period of years."
In the case of King v. Fronk, 14 Utah 2d 135, 378
P.2d 893, the Supreme Court of the State of Utah discussed the question of what length of time was necessary
to satisfy this requirement and stated as follows:
"Boiled down, it seems to us that establishment of
boundary by acquiescence may be predicated upon
the existence of a visible monumented line persisting for at least 20 years or upwards, shown
specifically or circumstantially in order to meet
or exceed the requirements of acquiring rights by
prescription. . . . "
The Court also indicated that it felt the seven (7) year
period called for in title by adverse possession was not
sufficient and stated as follows:
"In practically all of the cases, it appears that more
than 20 years has been the yardstick. In one case,
dictum-wise, Mr. Justice Wolfe suggested that the
adverse possession statute calling for 7 years condi11
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tional enjoyment should be the hallmark for
boundary by acquiescence cases. This period is unrealistic. It fails to recognize that under the adverse possession statute, — strictly a limitations of
action statute, one must have paid taxes, improved
the property and the like and claimed it continuously for 7 years. To assert that a 7-year persistent
fence, nothing more, could ripen into title, is to
overlook the following: (1) that it would establish
title in the fencemaker, (2) without his having complied with the sanctions of the adverse possession
statute, which does not give title but only a defense against others who claim it."
As it was pointed out in the King case, supra, the
Supreme Court of the State of Utah has not clearly established what length of time is necessary to have the doctrine
of boundary by acquiescence become applicable. However,
all cases, both before and since the decision, wherein the
doctrine has been found to be applicable, have involved
periods of 20 years or more. See Johnson v. Sessions, 25
Utah 2d 133, 477 P.2d 778 (21 years); Motzkus v. Carroll, 7 Utah 2d 237, 322 P.2d 391 (45 years); Willie v.
Local Realty Company, 110 Utah 523, 175 P.2d 718 (59
years); Ekberg v. Bates, 121 Utah 123, 239 P.2d 105 (50
years); Kanus v. Smith, 20 Utah 2d 444, 354 P.2d 124
(20 years); Johnson Real Estate Company v. Nielson, 10
Utah 2d 380, 353 P.2d 918 (25 years); Provonsha v. Pitman, 6 Utah 2d 6, 305 P.2d 486 (58 years). A period of
nine (9) years was held to be insufficient in the case of
Brien v. Smith, 100 Utah 213, 112 P.2d 145.
In oral argument presented to the Court at the time
of the hearing of a Motion for a Judgment on the Pleadings, the Plaintiffs' attorney indicated that they re12
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lied upon the following language from the case of Brown
v. Milliner, 120 Utah 16, 232 P.2d 202, in support of their
claim of title to the disputed property. The Court stated as
follows:
"A review of the Utah cases involving boundary
disputes reveals that it has long been recognized in
this State that when the location of the true boundary between two adjoining tracts of land is unknown, uncertain or in dispute, the owners thereof may, by parol agreement, establish the boundary
line and thereby irrevocably bind themselves and
their grantees."
The Plaintiffs' contention being that at the time of
the meeting between Plaintiff Fred N. Hobson and William Marsden in August of 1958, the boundary line was
orally established by them and no requirement of acquiescence in the same for a "long period of years" need be
shown.
However, from a reading of the Brown case, it is
apparent that the Court in using the foregoing language
was discussing the doctrine of boundary by acquiescence
and that the quoted language must be read in context. In
outlining the issues presented by the case, the Court
stated at the outset as follows:
". . . The appellant claims title to the land in
dispute under a deed while the respondent claims
title under the doctrine of boundary by acquiescence and by adverse possession. . . ."
In further discussing the doctrine the Court stated as
follows:
"We have further held in this state that in the absence of evidence that the owners of adjoining
property or their predecessors in interest ever ex13
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pressly agreed as to the location of the boundary
between them, if they have occupied their respective premises up to an open boundary line visibly
marked by monuments, fences or buildings for a
long period of time and mutually recognized it as
the dividing line between them, the law will imply
an agreement fixing the boundary as located, if it
can do so consistently with the facts appearing, and
will not permit the parties nor their grantees to depart from such line. Holmes v. Judge, 31 Utah
269, 87 P. 1009. This rule is sometimes referred to
as the doctrine of boundary by acquiescence. . • "
[Emphasis added}
The Brown case was cited with approval in the case of
Blanchard v. Smith, 123 Utah 119, 225 P.2d 729, which
held that even though an oral agreement between adjacent
property owners can fix a boundary line, it must be
acquiesced in for long period of years. In addressing itself to this question, the Court stated in part as follows:
" W e repeatedly have held that neighbors, by oral
agreement may establish a common boundary
which, after sufficiently long acquiescence, cannot
be established. . . . "
Also, in the case of Davis v. Riley, 20 Utah 2d 325,
437 P.2d 453, Justice Callister, in a concurring opinion,
discusses the doctrine of boundary by acquiescence and
states as follows:
"This doctrine is premised on either an express
parol agreement by adjoining owners fixing the
boundary or the court will imply such an agreement by indulging 'in a fiction that at some time in
the past the adjoining owners were in dispute or
uncertain as to the location of the true boundary
and that they settled their differences by agreeing
14
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upon the fence or other monument as the dividing
line between their properties.' [Emphasis added}
. . . The doctrine of boundary by acquiescence
cannot be utilized as a subterfuge to avoid compliance with the statutory provisions for adverse possession" [Emphasis added}
The "long period of years" rule is obviously designed
to insure that people dealing with either adjacent land
owner may be placed on notice of any discrepancy in the
boundary line as contrasted to the legal description by
physically observing a long established fence line or other
monuments obviously separating the properties. T o allow
adjoining land owners to orally establish the boundary
line between the tracts without the long acquiescence required by the doctrine, would lead to uncertainty and
much controversy when questions arose concerning the
location of the boundary line.
A further ground upon which Plaintiffs' claim of
title to the property based upon the doctrine of boundary
by acquiescence must fail is the requirement that there
must be a dispute or uncertainty as to the location of the
boundary line between the adjacent owners prior to the
establishment of the permanent boundary and that if it is
marked by mutual mistake, it may be corrected. The latter
part of this was referred to by the Court in the Blanchard
case, supra, and the Court quoted with approval from 8
Am. Jur. 2d, Boundaries, Section 77, p. 801, which provides as follows:
"If, however, the parties undertake by a parol
agreement to fix the location of a boundary line
under the belief that they are fixing the true bound15
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ary line, when in fact, it is not, their agreement is
not binding and may be set aside by either party
upon the discovery of the mistake. . . ."
It is apparent that William Marsden and Plaintiff Fred
N . Hobson, through a mistake, established a boundary
line which did not conform to the actual boundary line
between the two tracts in question and upon discovery
of this mistake by Panguitch Lake Corporation in 1968,
they were entitled to correct the same which was done.
Also, in the case of Carter v. hinder, 23 Utah 2d
204, 460 P.2d 830, the Court discussed the proposition
that a dispute or uncertainty must exist between the adjacent land owners in order for the doctrine of boundary by
acquiescence to be applicable. The Court stated as follows:
". . . Without a dispute and uncertainty as to the
true location of the boundary line there can be no
boundary line by acquiescence under an oral agreement between adjoining property owners. . . ."
As was noted in the Statement of Facts, the Plaintiff Fred
N . Hobson testified that there was no dispute between
himself and William Marsden as to the location of the
boundary line and he was merely relying upon Mr. Marsden's hand-held surveying technique to establish the same.
(R. 199, R. 237, 238) Further, there was no finding by the
Court that such a dispute existed at the time of the meeting
in August of 1958.

16
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POINT

III

IN 1968 THE PLAINTIFFS AND DEFENDA N T PANGUITCH LAKE CORPORATION
ORALLY AGREED T O THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A BOUNDARY BETWEEN
TRACTS 1 AND 3.
For the purpose of this agreement it must be assumed
that adjacent land owners may, by oral agreement, establish a boundary line between the tracts without the requirement that the same be marked and acquiesced in for
a "long period of years," as contended by the Plaintiffs.
On June 19, 1968 a meeting took place on the disputed boundary line wherein the following persons,
among others, were present: Plaintiff Fred N . Hobson,
Oliver D. LeFevre on behalf of Defendant Panguitch Lake
Corporation, David Bruce Whited, a surveyor hired by
the Plaintiffs, Marvin Rice who purchased property in the
disputed area from Plaintiffs, and David Watson, an employee of Defendant Panguitch Lake Corporation. At the
time of this meeting, the fence line established by the
Plaintiff Fred N . Hobson in 1958 had been removed and
the correct boundary line had been located by a surveyor
retained by Panguitch Lake Corporation and Mr. Whited
who had surveyed the boundary line for the Plaintiffs.
The following is the testimony of each of the persons
present at the meeting concerning the conversation which
took place as a result of the surveys:
FRED N . HOBSON:
"Q—Did you agree to assist Mr. LeFevre of the
Panguitch Lake Corporation putting in the fence
line in accordance with Mr. Whited's survey line?
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A—If that can be proven that is correct, I would
do anything fair. I said the line on the other side
of the fence is mine. But I also said that the surveyor, if he says that's the line, that's the line, but
I didn't concede any land on either side of the line
that I bought from William B. Marsden." (R. 261)
MARVIN RICE:
"Q—Tell me what was said by each party.
A—Well, I don't really recall Mr. LeFevre saying
anything. Mr. Hobson said, 'Well, if this is the
fence line, this is it,' and he says, 'I want a very
good fence put up,' he stressed this very much, he
said he wanted a good fence put u p and that he
would pay half of the cost and half of the help in
assembling the fence on this line.
Q—Did he say where the fence was to go?
A—On this survey line.
Q—That is on this Whited survey line?
A—On the Whiting survey line. {Whited]
Q — w a s anything further said at that time by
either of these parties about this disputed boundary line?
A—Well, I know him and Mr. LeFevre shook
hands and said there would be no hard feelings."
(R. 319, 320)
DAVID BRUCE W H I T E D :
"Q—Regardless of what the line was, they were
talking about the construction of another fence; is
that correct?
A—Mr. Hobson said if the fence had to be moved,
he'd help build it.
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MR. CHAMBERLAIN:
moved; is that right?

If the fence had to be

A—The reason for the—the reason that the agreement on the line was, is that there was enough
discrepancy in the two surveys that if I continued
on my survey, it would be meaningless in order to
tie down the location of the fence, so I went to
Mr. Hobson and I went to Mr. LeFevre and I said,
'Now, this is where Mr. Plat puts the property
line?' And I said, 'This is where I put it/ and I
said, ' 'there's enough discrepancy that if I continue on this, I'm going to be some eight or ten
feet off,' even though the point we were looking at
we were within 18 inches. It was 18 inches where
we were looking at it, and it was approximately a
foot or less than a foot at the corner. So in order
to establish the location of that line, I was going
to survey and make my further ties, then I got
them to agree on it and then I drove the stake in
the middle and then continued on with the survey." (R. 343, 344)
MR. LE FEVRE:
"Q—So Mr. Whited, who was Mr. Hobson's surveyor, was better for you than was your own; is
that correct?
A—In this particular point where the transit is
set up.
Q—Okeh, Go ahead.
A—And he says, 'What can we d o / and I said,
'Let's split the difference.'
THE COURT: W h o was that?
A—Mr. Fred Hobson. He said, 'What can we do,'
and I said, 'Let's split the difference.'
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Q—What did he say to that?
A—And he was agreeable to this.
Q—Was anything further said about the establishment?
A— . . . and Fred said, T will send a man to help
you put this new fence according to the new line
we established/ and then he mentioned something
to Mr. Rice about, 'You will have to move these
other lots back' or something, that were in question/' (R. 359, 360)
MR. WATSON:
The parties stipulated that if Mr. Watson were
called to testify, his testimony would be the same
as that of Mr. LeFevre concerning the meeting in
question. (R. 372)
As can be seen by the foregoing, it is apparent that a
meeting did take place on June 19, 1968 wherein the
parties agreed to establish the disputed boundary line between tracts 1 and 3 based upon the surveys performed for
the parties and further agreed to construct a fence along
this line. The fence was constructed immediately following this meeting by Defendant Panguitch Lake Corporation who has had possession of the disputed property since
that date. (R. 360) Finding of Fact No. 10 states, in effect,
that any conduct on the part of Plaintiffs subequent to the
meeting with William D. Marsden in 1958 did not constitute a reconveyance or relocation of the line established
at that time. This so called finding is in reality a conclusion of law which is not supported by applicable legal
principles and the facts upon which it is purportedly based
and which have been set forth above clearly would not
support the same.
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Thus, if in fact the boundary line was established by
the meeting between William Marsden and Plaintiffs in
August of 1958, it was relocated by the meeting of June
19, 1968 and title to the disputed property should be
quieted in Defendant Panguitch Lake Corporation.

POINT

IV

DEFENDANT PANGUITCH LAKE CORPORATION IS ENTITLED T O RECOVER DAMAGES A N D ATTORNEY'S FEES FROM
T H I R D PARTY DEFENDANTS.
The trial of the case which was held on November
5 and December 15, 1971 was limited to the issues concerning the location of the boundary line in dispute. (R.
85, 135) Notwithstanding this, at the time the Decision
was rendered by the Court, the same denied the claim of
the Defendant Panguitch Lake Corporation for damages
and attorney's fees against the Third Party Defendants for
breach of the covenants contained in the Warranty Deed.
(R.97)
Thereafter, the Defendant Panguitch Lake Corporation made a Motion to amend the Findings of Fact and
Judgment and to make additional Findings of Fact pursuant to the provisions of Rules 52 and 59 of the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure. (R. pp. 99-102) This Motion
was heard by the Court and on December 13, 1973 an
Order was entered which provided in part as follows:
". . . {T}he court holds that the reduction in purchase price shall be determined by the agreed price
per acre paid by Panguitch Lake Corporation as
per agreement of September 15, 1965.
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The costs and attorney's fees sought by the Third
Party Defendants are denied."
By the Warranty Deed dated September 15, 1965,
the Third Party Defendants conveyed title to the property in question, including the disputed area, to the Defendant Panguitch Lake Corporation. (Exhibit 20) The
law of the State of Utah is to the effect that if a grantor
conveys legal title to property to a grantee by Warranty
Deed and title in the grantee is challenged or found to be
defective, the grantee is entitled to recover from the
grantor damages for the breach which include compensation for any property lost and costs and attorney's fees incurred in connection with the defense of the title. In this
regard, the Supreme Court of the State of Utah in the
case of Creason v. Peterson, 24 Utah 2d 305, 470 P.2d
403, stated as follows:
". . . The majority rule, with which we are in
accord, is that there is a breach of warranty when
it is shown that the grantor did not own the land
that he purported to convey by the warranty deed
description. The covenants involved are of seizin
and of good right to convey the property, which
for the purposes considered in this case, are synonymous; and the breach thereof is made out by a
showing that those rights did not exist in the
grantor, and it is not necessary to show an actual
eviction or threat thereof. However, even though
the grantee is entitled to the peaceable possession
and enjoyment of the property he purchases in
accordance with the warrants, he is entitled only to
the damage he suffers as a result of the breach
thereof, but this includes taking such measures as
are reasonable and necessary to clear up any difficulty which would represent a substantial flaw in
his title.
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. . . As above noted, inasmuch as it is shown that
there was a technical defect in the title, the plaintiffs would be justified in doing whatever was reasonable and prudent to clear it up; and if this involved the necessity of employing an attorney, the
reasonable expense therefor would be compensable. . . ."
Other cases setting forth this proposition are: VanCott v.
Jacklin, 63 Utah 412, 266 P. 460 and Lowe Co. v. Simmons Warehouse Co., 39 Utah 359, 117 P. 874.
In accordance with the legal principles set forth
above, the Defendant is entitled to recover reasonable attorney's fees and costs in connection with the defense of
the title from Third Party Defendants and if the title to
the property is quieted in the Plaintiffs, it is also entitled
to recover damages from Third Party Defendants as a result of the loss of the same.

CONCLUSION
The evidence clearly demonstrates that at the time
the boundary claimed by the Plaintiffs was purportedly
established, the person with whom they dealt, to-wit: William Marsden, had no ownership interest in the property
and no authority from the true owner to enter into such an
agreement.
The Plaintiffs have failed to pay taxes on the disputed property and, thus, may not claim title to the same
by adverse possession. The possession of the property by
the Plaintiff for a period of ten (10) years is an insufficient length of time to comply with the requirement that
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the same be held for a "long period of years/' Further,
there was no dispute concerning the boundary line purportedly established and the same was located by a mutual
mistake and may be set aside.
If the oral agreement purporting to establish the
boundary line in 1965 is held to be sufficient, the oral
agreement re-establishing the same in 1968 is likewise
sufficient and title to the property should be quieted in
Defendant Panguitch Lake Corporation.
As a result of the breach of the covenants contained
in the Warranty Deed, the Defendant Panguitch Lake
Corporation is entitled to recover attorney's fees in connection with the defense of the title and damages for the
loss of the property in the event title to the same is quieted
in Plaintiffs.
Respectfully submitted,
J. A N T H O N Y EYRE
Kipp and Christian
520 Boston Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorneys for Defendants,
Tbird-Party Plaintiff
& Appellant
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I hereby certify that I mailed two copies of APPELLANTS BRIEF to Ken Chamberlain, Attorney for Plaintiffs/Respondents, 76 South Main Street, Richfield, Utah;
Thorpe Waddingham, Attorney for Third-Party Defendants/Respondents, Delta, Utah and to Paul M. Hansen,
Attorney for Fourth Party Defendant/Respondent, 817
Oak Street, Ogden, Utah, this .&&&&. day of May, 1974.
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